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Lockes Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations James Gibson

Lockes Theory of Knowledge and Its Historical Relations

James Gibson

Published September 12th 2013
ISBN : 9781230465524
Paperback
100 pages
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 About the Book 

This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1917 edition. Excerpt: ... which a merely probableMoreThis historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1917 edition. Excerpt: ... which a merely probable conviction may be held. In some cases, he holds, the grounds of probability are so strong that our assent is as necessarily determined by them as by a strict demonstration, but even in these extreme cases he still rigidly refuses the name of knowledge1. For when we have knowledge, we have something which excludes thejossibility not only of doubt but of error. Now this does not merely mean that knowledge is formally distinguished from error, as the true from the false. It implies that a. form of absolutely certain cognition exists, which no new facts or considerations can weaken or overthrow, and which is capable of being recognised as such by the subject. What we once know, we are certain is so- and we may be secure that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overthrow our knowledge or bring it in doubt2. Besides its certainty, there are two other general features which Locke considers that knowledge must possess, if it is to be of any serious value. In the first place, k-must-possess-the.character of being instructive or synthetic, by which it is distinguished from the merely verbal certainty of the trifling propositions, which only repeat in the predicate the whole or a part of the idea which constitutes the subject. And further, however subjectively conditioned and limited in its immediate range, the knowledge which Locke undertakes to investigate is regarded by him as somehow referring to and holding good of a reality which is independent of the knowing mind and of the ideas by which it is known. Besides being certain and instructive, our knowledge must be real. Nor must it be supposed that this real and instructive certainty is to be found either exclusively or typically in reference to...